Bill Belichick not going into the Pro Football Hall of Fame as a first-ballot selection? On the surface, that feels like trying to argue Tom Brady wasn’t a franchise quarterback.
This is the most decorated coach of the Super Bowl era - a man whose name is practically etched into the NFL’s modern history books. But as strange as it sounds, under the current Hall of Fame voting structure, Belichick falling short wasn’t just possible - it was predictable.
Let’s be clear: this isn’t about Belichick’s résumé. That part’s airtight.
The man has eight Super Bowl rings (six as a head coach, two as an assistant), 31 playoff wins, and a coaching tree that stretches across the league. He’s a walking, hoodie-wearing monument to sustained excellence.
Almost everyone involved in the Hall of Fame process agrees - he’s a lock. So how does a lock not get in?
The answer lies in the system, not the selectors.
Before the final vote even happens, the Hall of Fame leans on three Blue-Ribbon Committees - one each for seniors, coaches, and contributors. These groups spend months combing through decades of football history, debating and vetting candidates to ensure that deserving figures, especially those from underrepresented eras, aren’t overlooked.
For the Class of 2026, those committees put forward a strong slate: Ken Anderson, Roger Craig, and L.C. Greenwood from the senior pool; Belichick as the lone coach finalist; and Robert Kraft as the contributor nominee. These names weren’t pulled out of a hat - they’re the product of deep football conversations and careful evaluation.
But here’s where things changed - and not for the better.
Up until 2025, each of those finalists would be voted on individually by the full 50-person selection committee. The question was simple: “Is this person a Hall of Famer?”
A yes vote from 80% of the selectors (40 of 50) meant enshrinement. Clean, clear, and fair.
Then came the rule change.
Starting last year, the Hall decided to group all five finalists from the seniors, coaches, and contributors into a single voting block. Instead of voting yes or no on each individual, selectors were limited to just three votes total. That’s three votes to spread across five deserving candidates - all of whom had already cleared the subcommittee gauntlet.
Do the math. With only 150 total votes up for grabs (50 selectors, three votes each), and a 40-vote threshold needed for induction, it becomes nearly impossible for more than two candidates to make the cut.
Three? Maybe, but that’s threading the needle.
Four or five? Forget it.
And yes, zero is now a very real possibility.
We saw the impact of this immediately. Last year, Sterling Sharpe was the only name to emerge from the senior category, resulting in a four-person Hall of Fame class - the smallest since 2005.
Instead of helping clear the logjam of worthy candidates, the new format made the bottleneck worse. Legends from the 1950s and earlier are still waiting their turn.
And even under the old rules, the system had its blind spots. Jerry Kramer, Ken Stabler, Cliff Branch - all had to wait far too long.
Some didn’t live to see their induction.
In Belichick’s case, it’s not that voters didn’t support him. In fact, several have said they did.
But under this new structure, a candidate doesn’t need opposition to fall short - they just need competition and limited ballot space. This wasn’t about rejection.
It was about scarcity.
There’s a simple fix: give selectors more votes. Let them choose four candidates instead of three.
Better yet, let them vote on all five finalists individually, just like before. If someone has a strong objection, they can leave a name off their ballot and explain their reasoning.
That’s transparency. That’s accountability.
That’s how the Hall of Fame should work.
Right now, it feels like voters are being asked to play a game of strategy instead of a game of honor. And when the Hall of Fame becomes more about voting tactics than football legacy, we’ve lost the plot.
If Bill Belichick - the architect of two decades of dominance - can miss the cut under this system, then it’s not the voters who need rethinking. It’s the game they’re being forced to play.