The Minnesota Timberwolves faced a tough crossroads this past summer. Fresh off consecutive trips to the Western Conference Finals, the front office had to make some hard choices about who to bring back-and who to let walk.
Now, 30 games into the season, one of those choices is coming back to bite them. Prioritizing Naz Reid over Nickeil Alexander-Walker?
That’s looking more like a misstep than a calculated risk.
Let’s rewind.
Julius Randle, Naz Reid, and Nickeil Alexander-Walker were all key contributors to Minnesota’s deep playoff runs. Each brought something unique to the table: Randle’s physicality and scoring punch, Reid’s offensive versatility off the bench, and Alexander-Walker’s perimeter defense and growing offensive game. But with the NBA’s second tax apron looming like a financial guillotine, the Timberwolves couldn’t bring everyone back at market price.
Randle was the no-brainer. He fit seamlessly alongside Anthony Edwards and Rudy Gobert, offering a rugged scoring option who could take pressure off both stars. That left Minnesota with a tough call: keep Reid, a stretch big with scoring upside, or Alexander-Walker, a defensive-minded guard whose game was still evolving.
They went with Reid. And so far, that decision hasn’t aged well.
The Case for NAW
Let’s talk contracts. Reid inked a five-year, $125 million deal-a hefty commitment for a player who’s essentially a high-level third big.
Alexander-Walker, meanwhile, signed a four-year, $61 million contract with the Atlanta Hawks. That’s $15 million annually for a player who’s now producing like a legitimate two-way starter.
And that’s not hyperbole. Alexander-Walker has taken a leap this season.
He’s still the defensive pest he was in Minnesota, capable of guarding multiple positions and hounding opposing ball-handlers. But now he’s added a reliable offensive punch.
He’s knocking down 37.3% of his threes on 7.5 attempts per game-a volume and efficiency combo that was unthinkable just a few seasons ago. He’s also stepped up in Trae Young’s absence, averaging 20.3 points per game as Atlanta’s second scoring option.
That’s not just improvement. That’s transformation.
Meanwhile, Reid has been... fine. Not bad, not great-just the same player we’ve seen the past couple seasons.
He’s still a capable scorer off the bench, but his shooting has dipped slightly, and he hasn’t added any new wrinkles to his game. For $25 million a year, you want more than “fine.”
The Depth Chart Fallout
The ripple effects of that decision are just as concerning. Minnesota believed it had enough young guards to fill the void left by Alexander-Walker.
Rob Dillingham, Terrence Shannon Jr., and Jaylen Clark were all expected to take steps forward. But so far, that bet hasn’t paid off.
Dillingham, a second-year guard, has struggled to find his footing and is showing early signs of being a miss. Clark is still searching for consistency on the offensive end, and Shannon has flashed potential but hasn’t put it together consistently. Bones Hyland has emerged as the fourth guard in the rotation, but he’s far from a defensive stopper-something Alexander-Walker brought every night.
That leaves Anthony Edwards carrying even more of the load in the backcourt. And while Ant is built for that kind of challenge, he shouldn’t have to do it alone.
A pairing of Edwards and Alexander-Walker would have given the Wolves one of the most dynamic, two-way backcourts in the league. Instead, they’re patching holes.
What Could Have Been
There were options. Minnesota could’ve found a way to keep both Reid and Alexander-Walker, even if it meant stretching the budget.
They could’ve negotiated a more team-friendly deal with Reid or let him walk altogether. There’s no question losing Reid would have hurt, but losing Alexander-Walker is proving to be the bigger blow.
The Wolves are still a contender, no doubt. But in a loaded Western Conference, every roster decision matters. And right now, the decision to let Alexander-Walker go is looking less like a calculated risk and more like a costly oversight.
The Timberwolves had a chance to double down on defense and versatility in the backcourt. Instead, they bet on scoring depth in the frontcourt. Thirty games in, it’s clear which path would have kept them closer to the top.