Baseball’s shortage of right-handed power is showing up everywhere, and the free-agent market is a pretty blunt reminder of it. The best options available are Randy Arozarena, Seiya Suzuki and Ryan Jeffers, which tells you plenty about how thin the supply really is.
That scarcity matters because several teams are hunting for exactly that kind of bat. The Guardians are coming off a major league-low 57 home runs from right-handers, even after adding Jo Adell.
The Marlins and Royals finished second and third fewest. The Phillies, Angels and Mariners sat 28th, 29th and 30th in right-handed slugging.
Those are the clubs staring hardest at a market that does not offer much help.
The broader trend is even starker. Right-handed hitters are coming to the plate less often, and when they do, they are producing less.
The article points to a league-wide drop in right-handed power in 2026, and the decline appears to be real no matter the reason. One possible explanation is that amateur development has tilted toward left-handed hitting.
Shohei Ohtani, for example, is right-handed but learned to hit left-handed because it gives him the advantage of being closer to first base. In this year’s first round, teams selected more left-handed hitters than right-handed ones, 13 to 11, with one switch-hitter mixed in.
Pitching may also be part of the story, though not in the obvious way. Compared with 2019, the boom year for right-handed power when pitchers had to face at least one batter, right-handed hitters are seeing fewer right-handed pitchers now, 59.8% this year versus 66.4% then.
In theory, that should help them. It hasn’t.
The bigger issue seems to be fastballs: righties are seeing fewer of them, and they are doing less damage against them. Their average against fastballs since 2019 has fallen much more than it has against non-fastballs, likely tied to higher velocity, up from 92.4 to 93.8, and the rise of the three-fastball family.
So what does the top of this class actually look like? Good players, but imperfect ones.
Suzuki stands out as the most dependable of the group. He has put together four straight seasons with at least 132 games, a .473 slugging percentage, 20 homers and a 125 OPS+.
He is the only right-handed hitter to post four straight years with at least 20 home runs and a 125 OPS+. He also makes strong swing decisions.
But there are reasons to be careful with the contract length: he turns 33 in August, is not a plus baserunner, saw his exit velocity dip in 2026 and, as a pull-side fastball hitter who likes to get the ball out front, has some exploitable holes.
Arozarena brings a different profile, but age is part of the concern there too. He is described as a consistent 20-20-20 guy - 20 homers, 20 steals and 20 hit by pitches - and he just posted a full-season best .381 OBP, helped by 26 HBPs, his third straight year of 20-20-20.
He stands on the plate and does not give ground. Still, the aging curve is a real issue, and his defense and arm are both poor.
His sprint speed has declined in each of the last four years.
Jeffers offers value in a different way. He is a bat-first catcher whose swing changes have held up, and with good swing decisions he has produced a .440 slug over the past four years.
His defense is below average, but he becomes more useful when he splits time between catcher and DH. The piece says he would seem to be a perfect fit for the Yankees.
France is another name in the mix after a huge season with the Padres, where he hit the ball harder than ever at 91.5 mph, up a full 2 mph from 2025, and showed his best bat speed. The comparison used is essentially a right-handed Jake Bauers with a better glove. The bet on France is that the bat speed and power keep playing, even without a long track record and with some swing-and-miss and chase in his profile.
Bohm is the frustrating one. He looks like he should hit for more power because of his size and swing, but it simply has not happened.
In six full seasons, he has never topped 20 home runs. He does not lift the ball to the pull side.
What he does do well is use the whole field with runners on, which helps explain his career .314 average with runners in scoring position, well above his overall .273 mark. The question for teams is whether that production is worth it for a corner player who brings little as a defender or baserunner, or whether someone can unlock more power the way it happened with Bauers.
The rest of the group includes Gleyber Torres, 30; Carson Kelly, 32; Mauricio Dubon, 32; Luis Robert Jr., 29; Tyler Stephenson, 30; and Taylor Ward, 33.
Boston’s move for Bauers was framed as a bargain and a strong addition. The Red Sox got him on a four-year, $58 million deal, which meant adding only $34.85 million over three years to the qualifying offer Milwaukee had on the table. The deal works out to a 3.3 WAR player at an overall AAV of $14.5 million, cheaper than what the Reds gave Jeimer Candelario, who got $15 million three years ago.
Bauers is not a plus defender, so he figures to spend more time at DH than at first base. His arrival should also push Boston toward moving on from left-handed hitters Jarren Duran and Masataka Yoshida.
Duran needs a change of scenery, while Yoshida brings little power and almost no value on defense or the bases. Over the last two seasons, the Red Sox gave those two 1,806 plate appearances and got too little back, with OPS+ marks of 97 and 104.
Even with a strong run-prevention profile last season, Boston’s offense was lacking, especially for a club playing in a hitter’s park. Outside of its 32-5 streak - which was obviously brilliant over six weeks - the Red Sox went 55-72 because they did not have enough punch. Only Toronto hit the ball with less exit velocity.
And Bauers alone will not fix that. Boston still needs a healthy season from Roman Anthony.
It needs to decide whether Franklin Arias should get the shortstop job, especially if he can be an upgrade over Trevor Story, who posted a 93 OPS+ and .296 OBP over 1,590 plate appearances with the team. And it needs to find out whether Adley Rutschman can reverse a career slide, after hitting .240 with a 101 OPS+ over his past three seasons compared with .268 and 129 over his first two.
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